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NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports.  Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash-
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
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No. 92-8346
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TERRY LEE SHANNON, PETITIONER v.
UNITED STATES
on writ of certiorari to the united states court
of appeals for the fifth circuit
[June 24, 1994]

  Justice Thomas delivered the opinion of the Court.
  In this case, we consider whether a federal district
court is required to instruct the jury regarding the
consequences to the defendant of a verdict of -not guilty
by reason of insanity,- either under the Insanity Defense
Reform Act of 1984 or as a matter of general federal
practice.  We conclude that such an instruction is not
required, and therefore affirm.

                            I

                            A
  Prior to the enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform
Act of 1984 (IDRA or Act), 98 Stat. 2057, as amended,
18 U. S. C. 17, 4241-4247, federal courts generally did
not recognize a verdict of -not guilty by reason of
insanity- (NGI).  Defendants who mounted a successful
insanity defense-that is, those who raised a reasonable
doubt as to their sanity at the time of the offense-were
simply found -not guilty.-  See, e. g., United States v.
McCracken, 488 F. 2d 406, 409, 418 (CA5 1974); Evalt
v. United States, 359 F. 2d 534, 537 (CA9 1966).  In
addition, there was no general federal civil commitment
procedure available to ensure that an insanity acquittee
would receive proper care and treatment.  Only in the
District of Columbia was a defendant who successfully
presented an insanity defense to a federal criminal
charge subject to a federal commitment process-a
process governed by a 1955 congressional enactment.
See 69 Stat. 609, as amended, D. C. Code Ann. 24-301
(1981).  Elsewhere, federal authorities were forced to
rely on the willingness of state authorities to institute
civil commitment proceedings.  Reliance on state cooper-
ation was -at best a partial solution to a serious prob-
lem,- however, and federal courts -[t]ime and again . . .
decried this gaping statutory hole.-  McCracken, supra,
at 417.
  Before the IDRA was enacted, the Federal Courts of
Appeals generally disapproved of instructing the jury
concerning the post-trial consequences of an insanity
acquittal.  Thus, jurors typically were given no informa-
tion with regard to what would happen to a defendant
acquitted by reason of insanity.  The courts in general
gave two reasons for disapproving such instructions.
First, they pointed out that, given the absence of a
federal commitment procedure, the consequences of an
insanity acquittal were far from certain.  Second, they
concluded that such instructions would run afoul of the
well-established principle that a jury is to base its
verdict on the evidence before it, without regard to the
possible consequences of the verdict.  See, e. g.,
McCracken, supra, at 423; Evalt, supra, at 546; United
States v. Borum, 464 F. 2d 896, 900-901 (CA10 1972).
  The only Court of Appeals to endorse the practice of
instructing the jury regarding the consequences of an
insanity acquittal was the District of Columbia Circuit.
See Lyles v. United States, 254 F. 2d 725 (1957) (en
banc), cert. denied, 356 U. S. 961 (1958).  In Lyles, the
D. C. Circuit addressed the jury instruction question in
the context of D. C. Code Ann. 24-301 (1951 Supp. V),
which, unlike generally applicable federal law, provided
for a special verdict of NGI and, as noted above, a civil
commitment procedure.  The Lyles court recognized the
-well established and sound- doctrine -that the jury has
no concern with the consequences- of a verdict, but
stated that the doctrine -d[id] not apply- to the situation
before it.  254 F. 2d, at 728.  According to the court,
although jurors generally were -aware of the meanings
of verdicts of guilty and not guilty,- they were unfamil-
iar with the meaning of an NGI verdict.  Ibid.  The
court concluded that jurors had -a right to know- the
meaning of an NGI verdict -as accurately as [they]
kno[w] by common knowledge the meaning of the other
two possible verdicts.-  Ibid.
  The acquittal of John Hinckley on all charges stem-
ming from his attempt on President Reagan's life,
coupled with the ensuing public focus on the insanity
defense, prompted Congress to undertake a comprehen-
sive overhaul of the insanity defense as it operated in
the federal courts.  The result of this effort was the
IDRA.  In the IDRA, Congress made insanity an
affirmative defense to be proved by the defendant by
clear and convincing evidence, and created a special
verdict of -not guilty only by reason of insanity.-  18
U. S. C. 17 and 4242(b).  In addition, Congress filled
the -statutory hole- that had been identified by federal
courts, see McCracken, supra, by creating a comprehen-
sive civil commitment procedure.  4243.  Under that
procedure, a defendant found NGI is held in custody
pending a court hearing, which must occur within 40
days of the verdict.  4243(c).  At the conclusion of the
hearing, the court determines whether the defendant
should be hospitalized or released.  4243(d), (e).

                            B
  At about 4 a.m. on August 25, 1990, a police officer
stopped petitioner Terry Lee Shannon, a convicted felon,
on a street in Tupelo, Mississippi.  For reasons not
explained in the record before us, the officer asked
Shannon to accompany him to the station house to
speak with a detective.  After telling the officer that he
did not want to live anymore, Shannon walked across
the street, pulled a pistol from his coat, and shot
himself in the chest.
  Shannon survived his suicide attempt and was
indicted for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon
in violation of 18 U. S. C. 922(g)(1).  At trial, he raised
the insanity defense, and asked the District Court to
instruct the jury that he would be involuntarily commit-
ted if the jury returned an NGI verdict.  The District
Court refused to give Shannon's proposed charge.
Instead, it instructed the jury -to apply the law as
[instructed] regardless of the consequence,- and that
-punishment . . . should not enter your consideration or
discussion.-  The jury returned a guilty verdict.
  The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed
Shannon's conviction.  981 F. 2d 759 (1993).  The court
noted that under its pre-IDRA precedent, juries were not
to be instructed concerning the consequences of an
insanity acquittal.  Id., at 761-762 (discussing
McCracken, supra).  Turning to the text of the IDRA,
the court observed that Congress had -said nothing
about informing juries of the consequences- of an NGI
verdict.  981 F. 2d, at 764.  Because there was no
-statutory requirement- to the contrary, the court
-adhere[d] to the established axiom that it is inappropri-
ate for a jury to consider or be informed about the
consequences of its verdict.-  Ibid.
  We granted certiorari, 510 U. S. ___ (1993), in order
to consider whether federal district courts are required
to instruct juries with regard to the consequences of an
NGI verdict.

                           II
  It is well established that when a jury has no sentenc-
ing function, it should be admonished to -reach its
verdict without regard to what sentence might be
imposed.-  Rogers v. United States, 422 U. S. 35, 40
(1975).  The principle that juries are not to consider
the consequences of their verdicts is a reflection of the
basic division of labor in our legal system between judge
and jury.  The jury's function is to find the facts and to
decide whether, on those facts, the defendant is guilty of
the crime charged.  The judge, by contrast, imposes
sentence on the defendant after the jury has arrived at
a guilty verdict.  Information regarding the conse-
quences of a verdict is therefore irrelevant to the jury's
task.  Moreover, providing jurors sentencing information
invites them to ponder matters that are not within their
province, distracts them from their factfinding responsi-
bilities, and creates a strong possibility of confusion.
See Pope v. United States, 298 F. 2d 507, 508 (CA5
1962); cf. Rogers, supra, at 40.
  Despite these familiar precepts, Shannon contends that
an instruction informing the jury of the consequences of
an NGI verdict is required under the IDRA whenever
requested by the defendant.  He also argues that such
an instruction is required as a matter of general federal
criminal practice.  We address each argument in turn.

                            A
  To determine whether Congress intended courts to
depart from the principle that jurors are not to be
informed of the consequences of their verdicts, we turn
first, as always, to the text of the statute.  The IDRA
refers to the subject of jury instructions only once, and
that reference occurs in its description of the possible
verdicts a jury may return.  Under the Act, -the jury
shall be instructed to find . . . the defendant-(1) guilty;
(2) not guilty; or (3) not guilty only by reason of insan-
ity.-  18  U. S. C. 4242(b).  The text of the Act gives
no indication that jurors are to be instructed regarding
the consequences of an NGI verdict.  As the court below
observed, the Act -leaves the jury solely with its cus-
tomary determination of guilt or innocence.-  981 F. 2d,
at 763.  The Act's text thus gives no support to
Shannon's contention that an instruction informing the
jury of the consequences of an NGI verdict is required.
  Shannon asserts, however, that an express statutory
directive is not necessary because, by modeling the
IDRA on D. C. Code Ann. 24-301 (1981), Congress
impliedly adopted the D. C. Circuit's decision in Lyles
and the practice endorsed by that decision of instructing
the jury as to the consequences of an NGI verdict.  For
this argument he relies on Capital Traction Co. v. Hof,
174 U. S. 1, 36 (1899), in which we stated:
      -By a familiar canon of interpretation, heretofore
applied by this court whenever Congress . . . has
borrowed from the statutes of a State provisions
which had received in that State a known and set-
tled construction before their enactment by Con-
gress, that construction must be deemed to have
been adopted by Congress together with the text
which it expounded, and the provisions must be
construed as they were understood at the time in
the State.-
See also Carolene Products Co. v. United States, 323
U. S. 18, 26 (1944) (-[T]he general rule [is] that adop-
tion of the wording of a statute from another legislative
jurisdiction carries with it the previous judicial interpre-
tations of the wording-); Cathcart v. Robinson, 5 Pet.
264, 280 (1831).  The canon of interpretation upon
which Shannon relies, however, is merely a -presump-
tion of legislative intention- to be invoked only -under
suitable conditions.-  Carolene Products, supra, at 26.
We believe that the -conditions- are not -suitable- in
this case.  Indeed, although Congress may have had
the D. C. Code in mind when it passed the IDRA, see
United States v. Crutchfield, 893 F. 2d 376, 378 (CADC
1990), it did not, in the language of Hof, -borrow- the
terms of the IDRA from the D. C. Code.  Rather, Con-
gress departed from the scheme embodied in D. C. Code
Ann. 24-301 in several significant ways.
  The IDRA, for example, requires a defendant at trial
to prove insanity by clear and convincing evidence, 18
U. S. C. 17(b); the D. C. statute, by contrast, employs
a preponderance standard.  D. C. Code Ann. 24-301(j).
A commitment hearing must be held under the IDRA
within 40 days of an NGI verdict, 18 U. S. C. 4243(c);
the period is 50 days under the D. C. scheme.  D. C.
Code Ann. 24-301(d)(2)(A).  Under the IDRA, a defend-
ant whose offense involved bodily injury to another or
serious damage to another's property, or the substantial
risk thereof, must demonstrate at the hearing by clear
and convincing evidence that he is entitled to release,
18 U. S. C. 4243(d); under the D. C. scheme, an
acquittee, regardless of the character of his offense,
need only meet the preponderance standard.  D. C. Code
Ann. 24-301(k)(3).  The IDRA provides that an
acquittee, once committed, may be released when he no
longer presents a substantial risk of harm to others or
to their property, 18 U. S. C. 4243(f); an acquittee
under the D. C. system may be released from commit-
ment when he -will not in the reasonable future be
dangerous to himself or others.-  D. C. Code Ann.
24-301(e).   Finally, in the IDRA, Congress rejected
the broad test for insanity that had been utilized under
the D. C. provision, and instead adopted a more restric-
tive formulation under which a person is deemed insane
if he is unable -to appreciate the nature and quality or
the wrongfulness of his acts.-  18 U. S. C. 17(a).  We
believe that these significant differences between the
IDRA and D. C. Code Ann. 24-301 render the canon
upon which Shannon relies inapplicable in this case.
  Alternatively, Shannon contends that a provision
explicitly requiring the instruction is unnecessary for a
different reason: namely, that Congress made its inten-
tion to adopt the Lyles practice crystal clear in the
IDRA's legislative history.  In particular, Shannon
points to the following statement in the Senate Report:
      -The Committee endorses the procedure used in
the District of Columbia whereby the jury, in a case
in which the insanity defense has been raised, may
be instructed on the effect of a verdict of not guilty
by reason of insanity.  If the defendant requests
that the instruction not be given, it is within the
discretion of the court whether to give it or not.-
S. Rep. No. 98-225, p. 240 (1983) (footnotes
omitted).
Members of this Court have expressed differing views
regarding the role that legislative history should play in
statutory interpretation.  Compare County of Washing-
ton v. Gunther, 452 U. S. 161, 182 (1981) (Rehnquist,
J., dissenting) (-[I]t [is] well settled that the legislative
history of a statute is a useful guide to the intent of
Congress-), with Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U. S. 597, 617 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (legislative history is -unreliable . . . as a
genuine indicator of congressional intent-).  We are not
aware of any case, however (and Shannon does not
bring one to our attention), in which we have given
authoritative weight to a single passage of legislative
history that is in no way anchored in the text of the
statute.  On its face, the passage Shannon identifies
does not purport to explain or interpret any provision of
the IDRA.  Rather, it merely conveys the Committee's
-endorsement- of the Lyles -procedure--a procedure
that Congress did not include in the text of the Act.  To
give effect to this snippet of legislative history, we
would have to abandon altogether the text of the statute
as a guide in the interpretative process.  We agree with
the D. C. Circuit that -courts have no authority to
enforce [a] principl[e] gleaned solely from legislative
history that has no statutory reference point.-  Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Elec. Workers, Local Union No.
474, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 814 F. 2d 697, 712 (1987)
(emphasis omitted).  We thus conclude that there is no
support in the Act for the instruction Shannon seeks.

                            B
  Setting the Act aside, Shannon argues that the in-
struction he proposes is required as a matter of general
federal criminal practice.  Presumably, Shannon asks us
to invoke our supervisory power over the federal courts.
According to Shannon, the instruction is necessary
because jurors are generally unfamiliar with the conse-
quences of an NGI verdict, and may erroneously believe
that a defendant who is found NGI will be immediately
released into society.  Jurors who are under this mis-
taken impression, Shannon continues, may also fear
that the defendant, if released, would pose a danger to
the community.  Shannon concludes that such jurors, in
order to ensure that the defendant will not be released,
may be tempted to return a guilty verdict in a case in
which an NGI verdict would be appropriate.
  Even assuming Shannon is correct that some jurors
will harbor the mistaken belief that defendants found
NGI will be released into society immediately-an as-
sumption that is open to debate-the jury in his case
was instructed -to apply the law as [instructed] regard-
less of the consequence,- and that -punishment . . .
should not enter your consideration or discussion.-  That
an NGI verdict was an option here gives us no reason
to depart from -the almost invariable assumption of the
law that jurors follow their instructions.-  Richardson v.
Marsh, 481 U. S. 200, 206 (1987).  Indeed, although it
may take effort on a juror's part to ignore the potential
consequences of the verdict, the effort required in a case
in which an NGI defense is raised is no different from
that required in many other situations.  For example, if
the Government fails to meet its burden of proof at
trial, our judicial system necessarily assumes that a
juror will vote to acquit, rather than to convict, even if
he is convinced the defendant is highly dangerous and
should be incarcerated.  We do not believe that the
situation involving an NGI verdict should be treated any
differently.
  We also are not persuaded that the instruction
Shannon proposes would allay the fears of the misin-
formed juror about whom Shannon is concerned.  -[I]f
the members of a jury are so fearful of a particular
defendant's release that they would violate their oaths
by convicting [the defendant] solely in order to ensure
that he is not set free, it is questionable whether they
would be reassured by anything short of an instruction
strongly suggesting that the defendant, if found NGI,
would very likely be civilly committed for a lengthy
period.-  United States v. Fisher, 10 F. 3d 115, 122
(CA3 1993), cert. pending, No. 93-7000.  An accurate
instruction about the consequences of an NGI verdict,
however, would give no such assurance.  Under the
IDRA, a postverdict hearing must be held within 40
days to determine whether the defendant should be
released immediately into society or hospitalized.  See
18 U. S. C. 4243(c), (d).  Thus, the only mandatory
period of confinement for an insanity acquittee is the
period between the verdict and the hearing.  Instead of
encouraging a juror to return an NGI verdict, as
Shannon predicts, such information might have the
opposite effect-that is, a juror might vote to convict in
order to eliminate the possibility that a dangerous
defendant could be released after 40 days or less.
Whether the instruction works to the advantage or
disadvantage of a defendant is, of course, somewhat
beside the point.  Our central concern here is that the
inevitable result of such an instruction would be to
draw the jury's attention toward the very thing-the
possible consequences of its verdict-it should ignore.
  Moreover, Shannon offers us no principled way to
limit the availability of instructions detailing the conse-
quences of a verdict to cases in which an NGI defense
is raised.  Jurors may be as unfamiliar with other
aspects of the criminal sentencing process as they are
with NGI verdicts.  But, as a general matter, jurors are
not informed of mandatory minimum or maximum sen-
tences, nor are they instructed regarding probation,
parole, or the sentencing range accompanying a lesser
included offense.  See United States v. Thigpen, 4 F. 3d
1573, 1578 (CA11 1993) (en banc), cert. pending, No.
93-6747; United States v. Frank, 956 F. 2d 872, 879
(CA9 1991), cert. denied, 506 U. S. ___ (1992).  Because
it is conceivable that some jurors might harbor misun-
derstandings with regard to these sentencing options, a
district court, under Shannon's reasoning, might be
obligated to give juries information regarding these
possibilities as well.  In short, if we pursue the logic of
Shannon's position, the rule against informing jurors of
the consequences of their verdicts would soon be swal-
lowed by the exceptions.
  Finally, Congress' recent action in this area counsels
hesitation in invoking our supervisory powers.  As noted
above, the IDRA was the product of a thorough and
exhaustive review of the insanity defense as used in the
federal courts.  Given the comprehensive nature of the
task before it, Congress certainly could have included a
provision requiring the instruction Shannon seeks.  For
whatever reason, Congress chose not to do so.  Under
these circumstances, we are reluctant to depart from
well-established principles of criminal practice without
more explicit guidance from Congress.

                           III
  Although we conclude that the IDRA does not require
an instruction concerning the consequences of an NGI
verdict, and that such an instruction is not to be given
as a matter of general practice, we recognize that an
instruction of some form may be necessary under cer-
tain limited circumstances.  If, for example, a witness or
prosecutor states in the presence of the jury that a
particular defendant would -go free- if found NGI, it
may be necessary for the district court to intervene with
an instruction to counter such a misstatement.  The
appropriate response, of course, will vary as is necessary
to remedy the specific misstatement or error.  We note
this possibility merely so that our decision will not be
misunderstood as an absolute prohibition on instructing
the jury with regard to the consequences of an NGI
verdict.  Our observations in this regard are not appli-
cable to Shannon's situation, however, for there is no
indication that any improper statement was made in the
presence of the jury during his trial.

                         *  *  *
  Because the District Court properly refused to give the
instruction Shannon requested, we affirm.

So ordered.